Public religion, Democracy and Islam: Examining the Moderation Thesis in Algeria

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Abstract:
Much of the scholarly debate over Islam and democracy has centered on what has been referred to as the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” (Schwedler 2006) and whether democratic institutions are capable of incorporating hostile religious actors. This paper proposes to build on this debate by broadening both our concept of inclusion and our expectations about its political effects. The paper presents a theoretical model for understanding the interaction between religion-state relationships and democratization processes in predominantly Muslim societies and argues that inviting ambivalently democratic religious actors into the public democratic space produces dynamics of both political moderation and religious change. The second half of this paper evaluates the mechanisms of the theory by tracing the evolution of two Islamist political parties in Algeria, the MSP-Hamas and Ennahda-Islah.

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Introduction
Much of the scholarly debate surrounding what Jillian Schwedler¹ has coined the “moderation-inclusion hypothesis” has focused on definitions of 1) what is meant by moderation; 2) what plausible mechanisms generated by inclusion may produce moderation; and 3) how much democratic context is necessary for those mechanisms to hold. Depending on how moderation is defined, what mechanisms are posed and how much democracy is required to make things work, scholars testing the hypothesis have come up with a range of positive, mixed and negative results. This has led to discussions on the interpretation of similar outcomes, especially over the meaning of Islamist party participation in not-fully-democratic regimes.² Does repeated Islamist participation in elections mean that Islamists have become more moderate or democratic? Or are they just waiting to build up enough political power to the point when they can democratically institute non-democratic ends? As long as there is some implied threat of repression, how can we distinguish between changes which are state-coerced and those which are induced by the benefits of inclusion?

It is difficult to deal fully with these complexities which arise from a region whose regimes have been characterized as various types of “liberalized autocracies.”³ In this paper I recognize the limitations to drawing hard theoretical conclusions about the future democratic behavior of Islamists using evidence from their participation in less-than-democratic regimes. Nevertheless, I argue that as long as measures of state liberalization entail a substantive change in the direction of open competition, and as long as candidates and parties have the chance to win power which allows them to influence policy, then we can still begin to explore whether

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important theoretical mechanisms function when Islamists participate in democratic politics. Moving beyond a simple inclusion-moderation schema, I argue that Islamist participation in some form of electoral politics ought to give 1) some indication about the “moderating” effects of democratic participation on Islamist behavior and discourse but also 2) reveal something about what kind of democratic society Islamist participation would likely help to form.

In what follows I present a modified version of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis which defines inclusion more broadly than is often understood and which contextualizes inclusion strategies by parallel changes in the institutional relationship between religion and state. While incorporating “classic” mechanisms of change, my model focuses on the effects that these types of strategies of inclusion have on the salience of religious identity in the political desires of both elites and individuals. Inclusion strategies, I argue, not only have an effect on the behavior and discourse of Islamist parties, but the behavior and discourse of the whole political and religious structure of society itself. Extending the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in such a way allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how the entrance of new religious actors in a changed public sphere can affect politics and society.

After presenting this model, I process-trace the hypotheses of the theory in the case of Algeria in order to test whether there is evidence that the mechanisms of the model hold true in a specific setting. Drawing on fieldwork in Algeria from 2007, 2009 and 2010, I make use of newspaper archives and interviews to analyze the change in behavior and discourse of two Algerian Islamist parties over a period of seventeen years. I first consider the ideological origins and subsequent evolution of political goals and platforms of either Islamist party. I then treat the increased role of institutional Islam within the Algerian regime and its relationship to the national practice of religious belief. There is evidence that political moderation of Islamist
parties has occurred in response to strategies of inclusion by the Algerian government as those parties have moderated their political demands and become more open to compromising with less-religious parties and individuals. The same strategy of inclusion has also coincided with religious growth in Algeria today which is at once less political and more independent of political movements than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, however, recent attempts by President Bouteflika to manipulate the religious infrastructure for his own political ends risks the re-politicization of Islam in Algeria.

**Radical, Moderate, Democratic?**

In order to demonstrate that Islamist parties have moderated in response to a strategy of inclusion, we first have to demonstrate that they were *radical* or *more radical* before they were offered inclusion. In the literature, “radical” is employed to describe Islamist parties’ explicit or implicit hostility to democratic institutions and ideas. While this hostility is sometimes equated with certain Islamist politicians’ denial of democracy and their advocacy of violence, it is often more associated with the “type” of democracy that Islamist politicians propose. In its most robust versions this argument focuses on the theological incompatibilities between the Islam that Islamists propose and democratic precepts. That version of Islam utilizes doctrine which claims there is no sovereignty outside of the sovereignty of God in order to irrevocably fuse religion and the state and endow unelected religious officials with ultimate political authority. In its ideal, an Islamic state, furthermore, would call for the full application of Shari’a law, which would grant wide powers to non-elected religious authorities to marginalize the individual rights of secular and other (and less) religious citizens by criminalizing their non-Islamic conduct and reducing their rights to express and organize freely, fundamental rights needed to guarantee free
and competitive elections in the first place. Rather than playing the part of a loyal opposition to elected, non-religious governments, Islamist parties would attempt to instrumentalize democratic institutions for non-democratic ends by mobilizing their religious faithful to vote in a confessional-authoritarian Islamic state, the one-man, one-vote, one-time hypothesis.

The radicalness of Islamist parties, thus, has to do with Islamism as a political ideology and the hostility of that ideology to democracy. This hostility can be described as a function of the religious exclusivity proposed at the heart of Islamism, which a) refuses the legitimacy of non-religious political parties and candidates and b) violates fundamental democratic rights which guarantee freedom for plural religious belief, expression and association. If we accept this definition of radical, we can then define moderation as the reduction of religious exclusivity. In their classic work on democratic transitions, Linz and Stepan⁸ argue that successful transitions to democracy occur when the majority of political actors and citizens agree to play by the democratic rules of the game. If the exclusive nature of Islamist parties’ words and deeds put in doubt their willingness to play by the democratic rules of the game, then our measure of moderation ought to be whether those same parties began saying and doing things which make clear that they will sustain those rules.

It is important to note here that Linz and Stepan’s definition of transition evokes the “minimal” or “procedural” definition of democracy⁹ which prizes the pragmatic nature of democracy as a legitimate political arena within which to solve conflicts. For these definitions, religious-based politics pose no problem as long as the proponents of those politics are willing to respect other democratic political parties and the basic rights of non-religious citizens.¹⁰ This is not the case for more substantive definitions of liberal democracy, which, in their ideal¹¹ do not recognize the legitimacy of religious authority to have an institutionalized role influencing the
national regulation of moral values. This paper’s definition of moderation is less trained on measuring how liberal, secular and western Islamists might become, than on whether or not they grow more committed to playing by the basic rules of the game.

To measure whether or not the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is valid our task is to show change: that Islamist parties had previously said and did things which put in doubt their willingness to play by the democratic rules of the game and that, on account of inclusionary measures by the regime, these same parties put to rest those doubts. This will involve some measure of their behavior (whether or not they participate in elections and adhere to some minimum requirements of rights) as well as some measure of their ideological discourse (whether or not they acknowledge the legitimacy of opposition politics and democratically elected officials).

It should be noted here that the decision of Islamists to participate in elections and moderate their political goals could be understood as the result of efforts by the government to manipulate or co-opt them. For the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to be valid, therefore, offers of inclusion must create some “arenas of democracy” within the regime, where Islamists can stake out their own policy positions relatively independent of government pressures. The patterns of action and discourse that Islamists establish within these arenas give us some indication of any substantive evolution of their policy and goals with respect to democracy. Whether they use their limited levers to strengthen democratic institutions, build deeper alliances with non-religious parties and create more internal party democracy can all be understood as evidence that Islamists have begun assuming habits of democracy that will probably not be so quickly shed if fully free and fair elections were to be had and won by them.
**Inclusion to Moderation?**

In her excellent review and critique of the various versions of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis, Schwedler\textsuperscript{15} argues that most scholars focus on the effects that 1) new institutional constraints and 2) the exposure to alternative views have on the strategic behavior and discourse of radical parties and candidates when they participate in elections and win political power.

While incorporating some of these mechanisms of change into my model, I want to focus here on the effects that the participation of Islamists in elections has for the political saliency of religious identity, specifically, the religious exclusivity of their political goals. In doing so, I argue that we should broaden our understanding of inclusion to mean not only an offer of electoral participation by the state, but also the greater range of governmental favoritism towards a religion which maintains, increases, or encourages a greater public role for Islam in the national life of society. States can do this by, among other things, allowing Islamist parties to compete in the electoral arena; highlighting or creating a special institutional perch for Islam in the constitution; creating legislation based on Islamic precepts; and synchronizing national holidays and celebrations to Islamic ones.

Focusing on inclusion in this way helps to highlight its potential as a strategy of negotiation which attempts to resolve two competing worldviews of state, a lay-secular one in which religious leaders are marginalized from public power, and a religious-Islamist one, in which lay-secular leaders are. In the Middle East, these lay-secular projects do not necessarily correspond to the explicitly anti-religious rhetoric found in the anti-clericalism of 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe or many communist regimes, but to the attempts by states to submit religious authority to the designs of a politically secular nationalist ideology, what Luizard has defined as the “authoritarian laïcité” prevalent in much of the region.\textsuperscript{16} Taken in this broader sense, religious
inclusion responds to the fundamental fears of Islamists about democracy and other western regimes which a history of such aggressive secularism generated. Inclusion does so by promising the possibility that Islam can influence policy-making (the implication of allowing Islamist parties into political power) and, by giving Islam some favored place in the regime, that the state will not make it its policy to marginalize that influence. I do not argue that this is the only path towards democratization for nations with predominantly Muslim populations where Islamic parties vie for power, but simply that a larger sense of inclusion makes for a more credible mechanism of behavior-inducing change.

I argue, therefore, that inclusion can help generate moderation, or better, can help encourage a wider acceptance of the (democratic) rules of the game as the combined and reinforcing effects of 1) the dynamics set into motion by the electoral process and 2) the changed conditions of the religion-state framework.

Once they have been persuaded to nominally sanction the electoral process, at an elite level, elections create pressures to mobilize outside of an exclusively religious base in order to gain political power.\(^{17}\) At the same time, once some power has been won, the electoral process requires that it be exercised with enough efficiency in order to maintain that power and win elections in the future. This is the classic manner by which many theorists have understood mechanisms of moderation. New institutional constraints change the costs of behavior for radical political parties, in certain cases making it less costly to participate than to engage in violent action by promising the achievement of similar results.\(^{18}\) The need to convince the average voter of their continued electoral worth and the need to produce material-political results in order to do so also means that pragmatic and technical politicians gain importance over radicals and ideologues\(^{19}\) and can stimulate an evolution in a party’s platform and ideas.\(^{20}\)
At the same time, radical religious leaders may respond to the pressures of electoral politics and the ascendance of pragmatists within the party by becoming more moderate themselves. Classic arguments of exposure argue that a strategic response to a change in the cost/benefit ratio of participation can also work hand-in-hand with mechanisms of learning to produce a substantive evolution of political goals. Putting radical politicians in charge of mundane political tasks, like fixing pot-holes,\textsuperscript{21} forces them to expend their energies on issues affecting the common good, and, as a result, to re-evaluate their relationship with the whole of the electorate.\textsuperscript{22} The presence of a free and critical press intensifies this exposure and forces Islamists to defend and reform their message before a skeptical audience.\textsuperscript{23} As Fuller notes,\textsuperscript{24} the need for practical results combined with a demanding press makes it much more difficult for Islamists to defend a simplistic “Islam is the Solution” platform, creating incentives, instead, to consider adopting other, less religiously-exclusive but politically successful, policy positions.

What is more, if a strategy of inclusion guarantees a non-manipulated public voice for Islam in the political life of the nation, religious elites can no longer play the “survival” or “protest” card to make successful political appeals. Religiously friendly government policies dampen the effect of Islamist electoral tactics based simply on an appeal towards protecting Islamic values, forcing Islamists, once again, to expand their mobilizing strategies to distinguish themselves and build support. Inclusion in this broader sense, therefore, reinforces the dynamics of electoral competition to prize those religious leaders who can re-frame their religious goals to include less-religious voters. These dynamics combined make it difficult for the voices of the most anti-democratic aspects of religious platforms to be projected electorally, namely, those which claim that one religion holds the rights to political and moral authority and refuse the legitimacy of plural political contestation.
Although it is often presented as a theory about elites, we would expect similar dynamics to operate at an individual level of analysis. If religious individuals are convinced by state actions of government favoritism of religion and are encouraged by their religious authorities to mobilize for elections, they will be more likely to understand the democratic arena as a legitimate place to solve their political problems. With the existential threat to their religious identity removed, it is also likely that their own religious identity will take on less salience in their political desires, and, exposed to appeals by other (non-Islamist but religiously-friendly) political parties, that they will consider giving them their political vote.

Further Reflections on Inclusion

So far we have hypothesized that a strategy of inclusion may generate moderation in the behavior and discourse of Islamist parties with respect to democracy if those offers of inclusion entail both a) being given the chance to exercise political power within some arenas of democracy and b) creating a more favorable relationship between religion and state. We have argued that this moderation occurs as a function of the political secularization of Islamist parties who set aside the most exclusively religious aspects of their religious-political platforms to win elections and exercise power. Before moving on to examine this theory in the case of Algeria, I would like to make two additional observations about this hypothesis.

First, the hypothesis does not predict that religious actors and ideas go away. One way of interpreting the key mechanism of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis is that through the promotion of the relationship of Islam and nation, state leaders rob Islamism of its political salience, and depoliticize the most anti-regime aspects of a rival political ideology. Yet, depending on one’s perspective, religious inclusion can also mean that Islamists have gotten
what they want: a chance to exercise political power and a greater role for Islam in the state. What is more, moderation does not necessarily mean that Islamists or their constituents will become secular individuals themselves or totally drop religious issues from their political agenda. We might reasonably expect, in fact, that the presence of Islamists in positions of political power, combined with religiously friendly state policies, would promote the attachment to an Islamic identity within any given society. The formation of a pluralism of political ideas and personal expressions of liberty might still be stimulated by timid processes of democratization, but that democratic pluralism will most likely be restrained within the nation’s greater Islamic identity.

Secondly, this hypothesis does not assume that moderation is unidirectional. Democratic states are quite capable of reversing democratic reforms, and if a governing regime decides to begin managing religious institutions for their political ends again, they subject themselves to the same claims of manipulation and coercion which earlier Islamists had used to delegitimize previous governments. Thus, there always remains the potential that religious authority will conflict with political authority again and un-moderate religion.

Cases

Much has been written on the surprising, wild period of political liberalization which occurred in Algeria between 1988-92. Much of that literature has focused on the formation and success of the Islamist party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and their head-on tensions with the existing regime which prefaced Algeria’s violent and complicated conflict of the 1990s that may have cost up to 150,000 lives. Although there is tantalizing evidence in support of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis which suggests that a FIS government might have expanded
democracy in Algeria, and other evidence that they would not have. It is difficult, if not impossible, to definitively weigh in on the debate because the FIS’s experience was so short-lived. This paper, therefore, examines the more recent and more lengthy experience of two other groupings of Algerian Islamist parties, the Harakat Mujtama al-Islami (HAMAS)/Mouvement de la société de la Paix (MSP)/Harakat Mujtama al-silm (HMS) and Ennahda /Mouvement du Rénouveau National (MRN)/El Islah, and the development of their political behavior and goals over time in response to strategies of inclusion by Presidents Zeroual and Bouteflika since 1995.

Both Zeroual and Bouteflika, with varying degrees of intensity, won elections promising a strategy of inclusion in the larger sense referred to above. Zeroual’s 1995 campaign contained offers of reconciliation with Islamists who had chosen armed contestation with the state and implied promises of greater inclusion and liberalization for the Algerian political system. Bouteflika’s 1999 presidential campaign intensified those offers, allowing most Islamist parties (with notable exceptions) to run in elections, and attempting simultaneously to strike an “historic compromise” with Islamism by increasing government favoritism of religion and producing a political blueprint for reconciliation.

**Origins and Hostilities**

This section explores the origins and platforms of these two parties and their founding figures to measure the extent to which and in which ways they were radical. As the amalgam of names above indicates, these two sets of parties, which are the main Algerian Islamist parties which have survived in the Bouteflika-era, have also frequently changed names and composition. This is due to both the 1997 change in legal requirements for acceptable political party platforms and, in the case of Ennahda, internal crises. The founding fathers, however, and principal
protagonists of both parties have largely remained the same. Thus, to simplify, HAMAS/MSP/HMS can be largely identified as the party of Mahfouz Nannah until his death in 2003, and the various iterations of Ennahda/MRN/El Islah can be identified with the figure of Abdallah Djaballah.

The first thing to note about the origins of both parties is their closeness to the FIS. Although they had geographic (Djaballah from Constantine, Nannah from Blida) and intellectual distinctions (Nannah’s closeness to the International Muslim Brothers versus Djaballah’s closeness to a more national Algerian Islamist tradition), Djaballah and Nannah have similar profiles of protest, organization and ideological grievances to those of the principal founders of the FIS. Djaballah and Nannah, along with FIS founding member Abassi Madani were highly influenced by the activity of the Islamic organization at the University of Algiers led by Ahmed Sahnoun and Abdelhatif Soltani, which culminated in the first Algerian Islamist “manifesto” of 1982. Nannah, Madani and Djaballah were also all members of Rabitat al-Dawa, founded in 1989 by Sahnoun as an attempt to unite Islamist leaders into a common ideological front; Nannah was even considered to be the second-in-command of the organization, after Sahnoun.27

All of their ideas have the tracings of common Algerian, Islamic intellectual forebearers, including Malek Bennabi and Ben Badis, whose ideas Sahnoun and Soltani had distilled in their lectures. All three also had connections to the earlier Islamist associations of the Association of Muslim Algerian Ulemas (AUMA) and the journal of Al-Qiyam.28 As such, they shared many of the same Islamist grievances, most prominently, that the Algerian (nominally “democratic”) state’s socialist ideology had betrayed and marginalized the role of Islam in the Algerian nation, creating a corrupt and failed state which had imposed institutions that menaced human beings’ spirituality and which could only be reformed by the restoration of an Islamic state.29 Prior to the
inclusion of Islamist political parties in 1990, Nahnah, Madani and Djaballah all rejected western, secular democracy; supported the institutionalization of an Islamic state based on Shari’a law; and identified Islam as the political panacea for all problems with the common slogan, “Islam is the solution.” While the actions of each party distinguished them in their degrees of “radicalness,” they shared an ambiguous conception of an “Islamic democracy,” and they were also ambivalent, to different degrees, about whether or not they would ever really recognize the legitimacy of secular opposition parties and play by the rules of the game.

This is a particularly important point to be made for Mahfoud Nahnah, who has often been portrayed as a consistently moderate democratic actor, on account of his early renouncement of violence in favor of the political process. While Nahnah’s decisions with respect to violence and electoral participation are important, he and his party’s commitment to democracy represent the evolution of a platform which was strengthened by policies of inclusion and the party’s own experience in power-sharing coalitions. Nahnah’s political moderation could not be wholly induced by studying his previous actions or by means of ideological differentiation from other Islamists of the time.

By certain standards, in fact, Nahnah appeared to be just as likely as other leading Algerian Islamists of the time to support non-democratic, extra-political actions to pursue his Islamist agenda. Nahnah had spent years building a network of Islamic donors, intellectuals and faithful from his base in Blida, through the creation of the charitable organization irshad wa islah, (incorporated officially as an association in 1989). Nahnah’s intentions, however, were never solely spiritual, and he cultivated a program of contentious political action. In 1976 he was arrested and imprisoned for three years for a botched attempt at sabotaging power lines. While this represented a relatively harmless act of civil disobedience, Nahnah also played a significant
part in recruiting and sending Algerian Islamists to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then on to Afghanistan to help fight the Soviets.\textsuperscript{31} Although Nahnah openly renounced violence as a political option in Algeria in the early 1990s, he and his parties’ objectives must be put into this proper context. Nahnah espoused a more moderate form of political Islamism which became even more moderate over time, but it was not clear how much Nahnah’s dedication to the creation of an Islamic state would allow him to support democratic precepts of pluralism and contestation, and whether his willingness to violently contest a profane government in Afghanistan would lead him to do the same in Algeria.

In earlier interviews, Nahnah’s attachment to more exclusive Islamic goals is clear in discourse and context. In the 1990s, for example, Nahnah coined the phrase “shuracracy” to describe the type of democracy his party stood for, one that was participatory, but according to Islamic traditions of consultation, or \textit{shura}, which would limit the effective powers of popular suffrage through Islamic legislation and moral guarantees.\textsuperscript{32} In such terms, Nahnah would describe himself and his party as “people who believe in Shari’a law, but not one imposed by swings of an axe.”\textsuperscript{33} While in the same line renouncing violence as a legitimate political recourse, Nahnah also raised doubts about his attachment to an electoral system that would allow non-religious parties to propose secular or immoral legislation which was opposed to his own Islamic vision of democracy.

Djaballah, on the other hand, was even clearer than Nahnah about his dedication to the construction of an Islamic state, as well as the tensions that such a dedication posed for a democratic regime. Throughout the 1990s, Djaballah was hard pressed when questioned to be openly pro-democratic, and the support he lent to elections were always hid between lines of attack against the democratic west and “laico-communists.” Unlike Nahnah, Djaballah never
rejected the FIS or (fully) the decisions of Islamist groups associated with the FIS to engage in violence against the state. At times, especially in the 1990s, Djaballah’s statements are laden with questionable indecision, leaving open the door to support violence against governments which discriminated against Islam, such as the following, “We privilege, in permanence, political action, but when the fuse is lit, everyone silences. So what to do then?”34 or referring to the killing of children by the Group Islamique Armée (GIA) as “just a detail.”35

Not only was it difficult for him even to evoke democracy in the 1990s, but Djaballah’s platform was overwhelmingly, exclusively religious, with little politico-economic content.36 His religious goals of the time were not tempered by the possibility of a space to work with non-religious parties, nor did he signal some possibility for cooperation with them. As he said in 1992, “Islam is a total agenda….It is not simply an empty slogan that anyone can use to do what they can. It is a total agenda whose application requires men who are competent in the material.”37

**Moderation**

Nahnah and Djaballah’s trajectories of inclusion and moderation have followed different courses. The direction of these paths reflect both the particular variations in either’s electoral successes as well as the general changes in the institutional framework which set the boundaries of the public and political space for Islam in Algeria.

Following a period of political closure, which began with the ban on the FIS in 1992, the creation of a “High Council of State” and Algeria’s subsequent descent into violence, Gen. Liamine Zeroual’s assumption of the Presidency in 1994 and his election to the post in 1995 marked the beginning of a new period of openness. His administration introduced new measures
that promised reconciliation with Algeria’s Islamists as well as the normalization of plural party competition, including (non-FIS) Islamist parties. Although these multiparty elections did not give birth to a fully democratic regime (suspicions of vote rigging hang over all of the post-1994 elections), some elections have been more free and fair than others. Among them, the presidential elections of 1995 and 2004, in addition to the parliamentary elections of 2002, could be considered Algeria’s most fair elections. Much greater doubt is associated with the 1999 presidential and then, especially, the 2007 parliamentary and 2009 presidential elections. Thus, we could generally characterize the period between 1995 and 2005-6 as one of relative political liberalization: even as clientelism continued to damage Algerian political life and democratic institutions remained tilted in the power of the executive, political parties of all stripes were able to compete for power; an animated, critical press was left relatively free to skewer its politicians, including the president; and associations and unions were allowed to challenge policies.

Nahnah was able to capitalize on the re-opening of the political space in Algeria and won twenty-five percent of the national vote in 1995. Adding Djaballah’s share to Nahnah’s, the two Islamists recuperated more than three-fourths of the aggregate Islamist vote which had presumably gone to the FIS in 1991. The renunciation of violence, to a greater and lesser degree, by the MSP and Ennadha, coupled with the traumatic experience of Algerian society with a decade of terror, meant that it was unlikely that either party would turn to violent politics in the short run. Yet, the failures of the Algerian state throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s had also kept the promise of political Islam to reform Algerian politics alive, and both Nahnah and Djaballah entered the political process in 1995 with an ideological vision which was essentially unchanged since their parties’ formations.
Nahnah’s support for the regime during its period of closure, his decision to participate in 1995, and his strong showing in those elections were rewarded with several middling ministerial portfolios, two for the period 1996-97, and seven in 1997-99. Then, in 1999 Nahnah accepted an invitation to ally with the new presidential candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. With Bouteflika’s election, Nahnah’s party was rewarded with more important ministries, such as “Industry and Redevelopment” and “Labor and Social Protection”, arguably some of Algeria’s most politically trying ministries. Following this incorporation into the Algerian political apparatus, a new pattern of MSP action and discourse emerged. Nahnah and his party would continue to mobilize around some Islamic goals, but they dropped their attachment to an Islamic state, or shuracracy, as an end in itself. Instead, the MSP began to more openly trade in ideological compromises for political goals and change the context of their Islamic pitch, looking to Islam for inspiration as “our history and our reference” but no longer as the all-encompassing feature of their political strategy.

Thus, in the early 2000s, the MSP continued to capitalize on religious issues, declaring itself in favor of increased Arabic education, but against any changes to the pro-Shari’a family code. Yet, even in these religious-cultural battles, the MSP proved it was ready to put aside its Islamic ideology for political gains. In 2004, for example, the MSP voiced opposition to the government’s proposed education reform that would suppress the offer of a degree in Islamic sciences in high schools, but then backtracked once it became clear that the President was not going to budge on the issue. The MSP reframed its opposition to the proposal by noting that the Algerian state had already, courageously, declared its commitment to a national Muslim identity and, that, as such, “the elements which make-up the national identity are not so much subjects to be taught, as a national task which is to be accomplished by the Algerian state.”
Similarly, together with Djaballah, the MSP also originally rejected any revision to the family code proposed by the government, whom they accused of forcing through laws which would encourage the secularization of society. Although both parties openly declared that there was no room for compromise on the issue, the MSP then publically stated it was ready to accept the full reform of the code if Bouteflika would only lift the state of emergency he had declared vis-à-vis terrorism. In doing so, the MSP showed it was willing to put aside its ideology in order to win more political freedom for itself and the whole of the Algerian system by working to put an end to a policy which the state had used to curtail political liberties. When Bouteflika refused such a deal, the MSP affirmed that their attachment to their alliance with Bouteflika was more important than their goals with respect to the family code, but continued to press Bouteflika on those goals nevertheless. In the end, both Bouteflika and the MSP compromised on their stands. The MSP and Islah’s opposition was strong enough to block the removal from the code of the legal requirement for women to present their male “tutor” in order to sign a marriage contract, but other revisions were pushed through over their proposals. Following passage of the reform, the MSP, but not Islah, expressed their enthusiasm over the compromise and the government’s friendliness towards Islamist goals.

Although the ability to compromise is not the only democratic value that matters, it is essential to our definition of moderate here which is measured as a function of the exclusivity of the party’s religious platform and behavior. The MSP’s actions show a growing attachment towards accepting policies and proposals that do not match the original formulation of their Islamic goals in order to keep playing the electoral game. Compromises on education and the family code are especially indicative of the extent to which an exclusive Islamic identity has ceased to be the driving force animating the MSP-HAMAS, assuming a reduced position,
instead, as part of a larger strategy of a political party trying to win and stay in power within a plural electoral arena. As the spokesman for the MSP-HAMAS in Algiers described this change,

“Many [Algerians] were afraid of an Islamic party and so our first gain as a party was to make an Islamic movement acceptable ... The MSP is a party in evolution. We are not a religious party, not even in our way of “Islamic” thinking – we are a civic party and do not try to make religion a totalizing aspect of our politics like the FIS did.”

This fundamentally political desire to make the Islamist side of their platform “acceptable” to a larger electorate who do not necessarily, or no longer, share their animating religious political goals has been determinative in allowing the MSP to change over time. Rather than allowing the exclusively religious ideals which inspired the party’s formation to dictate their politics, they have adapted the spirit of those ideals to a new, partially democratic environment. By systematically compromising, the MSP-HAMAS have made their claims to accepting pluralism and legitimate, non-religious opposition much more credible. In such a way, Nahnah and the MSP have moved from an exclusively religious agenda (from 1989 to 1994), to a nominal embrace of the democratic rules of the game (1995-1999) to an increasingly full acceptance of them (1999 to present). We could say, in broad strokes, that Nahnah travelled a path from theocracy to shuracracy to democracy and that, over time, the MSP became more of what some have termed “Muslim (as opposed to Christian) Democrats” than Islamists, a parallel which some within the MSP now explicitly seem to acknowledge.

Perhaps even more indicative for this paper is the evolution of Djaballah as a political figure. Djaballah spent much of the 1990s defending his political program in purely religious terms and rejecting cooperation with other parties. In doing so, he dodged a fully democratic discourse. Yet, by the year 2000, his tune had begun to change. In 1998 Djaballah’s party (then officially Ennahda) suffered the first of a series of crises, with leading members criticizing his
overly-emphasized religious discourse and his reluctance to speak about Algerian democracy or even an Algerian republic. Djaballah rejected what he saw as a coup d’état from within and left the party to form an independent political party, el Islah or the MRN, with his leading supporters.

While rhetorically keeping up his *pur et dur* version of Islamism, Djaballah began to change the course and strategy of his party noticeably following this internal crisis. In 2000, he went on record for the first time conditionally supporting the promotion of Tamazight (the language of Algeria’s Berber minority), a shift from a full and exclusive defense of Arabic with its accompanying connotations of Islamic authenticity. Then, in the 2002 parliamentary election campaign, Djaballah significantly widened the platform of his party to appeal to a larger, less-religious audience. Symbolically, he stopped wearing a conservative Islamic *qamis* in public, donning a Western suit and tie instead; he put women at the head of his party lists in the Kabyle regions (simultaneously dropping ex-FIS members from the lists); and devoted much of his political platform to the cause of youth sports. His strategy of remaining independent, and Islamist, but more open, reaped some results, and the MRN became the largest opposition force in parliament in 2002. Following the elections, Djaballah and his deputies pressed for a wide range of economic, wage and electoral reforms. In a rare success for the Algerian parliament, MRN deputies passed a reform of the electoral law. The law was designed to give individuals more rights of information regarding candidates and party lists and grants both Islamists and secular opposition forces more institutional protection from state-sponsored electoral fraud.

Djaballah, with his eyes on the 2004 presidential elections, declared that the MRN represented above all [including religion] the “Algerian nation” and that, “diversity is positive and perfectly sanctioned by God and it is only the misunderstanding of Islam which leads people to say that all must be of the same political color.” Then, to contest the re-election of President
Bouteflika, Djaballah entered into an electoral alliance with the only Algerian political party to continue to openly militate for a fully secular democracy, namely, Said Saadi’s *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie* (RCD), whose legal status as an explicitly secular party Djaballah had challenged ten years earlier. This temporary alliance set a new institutional strategy for Djaballah, bent on establishing, above all, a democratic alteration of power and continuing to form alliances in order to do so. As with the electoral law, Djaballah and his party understood that such an alteration represented a desirable check on the limits of government power, even if it equally strengthened the possibility for all opposition parties to assume power. Therefore, explains an Islah MP in Algiers, in this context,

“The essential goal is to continue to work, again and again, within the legal framework, within the legislature, through peaceful change and even through alliances … to create a change in this current political power.”

The evolution of Islah’s goals and discourse reflect a similar movement in the MSP and represents a shift of the locus of the parties’ activities and energies from one of promoting Islam to one that is engulfed by dealing with the myriad other mundane activities which all political parties must act on to survive electoral politics. Both parties have been forced to devise responses to national political events before a live audience, and many of those events leave little room for Islamic spin on them. Over the last five years, the MSP-HAMAS and Islah have said much more about strikes, electoral laws, the new budget and the Algerian housing crisis than the Islamic nature of the Algerian constitution. The dynamics of party politics, therefore, have pushed Islamic identity issues away from the dead center of either party’s animating force.

The success of Bouteflika’s politics and electoral campaigns has helped reinforce this shift. While it is difficult to evaluate how many former Islamist votes Bouteflika successfully courted, he masterly established a wide, grassroots voter base by reaching out to every sector of
Algerian society, including, especially, youth and religious individuals. By pursuing an historic compromise with Islamism, Bouteflika seriously weakened the Islamist claim to a vote for them on the basis of their identity alone. As an MSP deputy from Bejaia noted, recognizing how the changed religious framework in Algeria had altered their political goals with respect to religion,

“It is therefore no longer necessary to Islamize the state and society. Algeria is a Muslim country. Algerians are Muslims. In this country there is the call to prayer. The mosques are full. What would it serve to Islamize a society where Islam is the religion of state?”

The simple merit of their Islamic identity has not helped the combination of either party to win more than a quarter of the popular vote since 1995, forcing both parties, in spite of exceptionally high rates of national religiosity, to campaign on the merit of their competence and other, non-religious political ideas. To that end, they have not been very successful. Despite slogging through what some observers deemed the most contested elections in contemporary Algerian history, Bouteflika’s 2004 re-election campaign was greatly successful, cancelling any of the gains Djaballah had hoped to consolidate from his 2002 showing by presenting himself as an independent Islamist candidate. The MSP’s coalition strategy with Bouteflika also earned them meager electoral results in 2002 and 2007 and seemed to indicate a similar weakening of public support for the party. This relative decline of Algerian Islamist parties since 2002 can be attributed to their failure (as of yet) to mobilize voters on strategies for responding to those more pressing political goals which Bouteflika has credibly addressed, including the housing crunch, domestic terrorism and Algeria’s international standing, while still appealing to voters’ Islamic sensibilities.
Post-moderation

While a strategy of inclusion has moderated the stances of Algeria’s Islamist parties towards democracy, the presence of those parties combined with the state’s public encouragement Islam has also had an effect on Algeria’s religious identity. Although it is difficult to date the inflection points of religiosity within a nation, especially with so little attitudinal data, studies of the early 2000s indicate a trend towards growth in societal religious practices, especially in the outward wearing of the veil and mosque attendance. The origins of these trends were already noticed in the early 1990s, when the rise of Islamism and the FIS were associated with the sudden appearance of non-Algerian Muslim fashions and the growing numbers of Algerians congregating at the mosque for Friday prayers. This represented a significant change in the intensity of religiosity observed in Algeria during its post-Independence years, which had diminished to what one French sociologist estimated at less than one percent.  

These growing numbers of religiously practicing faithful filled the spaces of a number of self-made “free” mosques built outside the structure, and thus control, of the official institution of Islam in Algeria and became flashpoints for the difficulties between the government and the FIS. In fact, the immediate task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the late 1990s and early 2000s was to reintegrate these organically-built mosques and give them an official Imam of the state. To aid in this task, Zeroual and Bouteflika restructured the Ministry of Religious Affairs and tried to depoliticize the official institution of Islam by forbidding political parties to claim partisanship of Islam in the 1996 constitution and, in 2001, making it illegal for Imams to allow political activities associate themselves with mosques.

In doing so, however, the state sanctioned and subsidized the trend towards religious growth. As political Islamism began to lose its fire, the Zeroual and Bouteflika governments
literally built on the Islamists’ initiative by constructing new mosques, training new cadres of Imams and championing Algeria’s Islamic heritage. Among other things, for example, Bouteflika has required a daily, public call to prayer, initiated government-sponsored competitions of youth Qu’ranic recitation, financed the construction of nearly 3,500 mosques and undertaken a massive project to build a Grand Mosque in Algiers to seat the new institution (since French rule) of an Algerian Grand Mufti.

Over the 2000s, levels of religiosity seemed to, in the least, hold steady and perhaps even grow. Although they are not strictly comparable surveys, the following table charts religious beliefs as registered in the 2002 World Values Survey in Algeria and the 2009 Gallup World Poll:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002 (World Values Survey)</th>
<th>2009 (Gallup World Poll)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Important in your Life</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Mosques/Religious Organizations</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from surveys conducted by the Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme (CIDDEF) confirm these trends. The surveys note, for example, that in 2008, 90% of women under the age of 41 reported that they had only recently begun to wear the veil, attesting to its spectacular growth in Algeria. In addition, between 2000 and 2008, the number of men and women favorable to “egalitarian” values between the sexes weakened, as measured according to a composite of answers to questions concerning attitudes
towards divorce, polygamy, custody rights, inheritance rights and women at work. These questions could be equally interpreted as a register of conservative religious values.

Although encouraged by both state policies and the presence of Islamists, however, this religious growth has taken on a life of its own and neither the state nor the Islamists can claim dominant leadership within the trend. The multiplication of religious choices within contemporary Algerian Islamic practices, in fact, also seems to reflect an increase in the exposure of individuals to new religious ideas, criticisms and fads, an access which democracy has promoted and globalization amplified. To paraphrase Moussaoui, contemporary Algerian religiosity could be described as Islam à la carte, one in which mufti.com and star tele-preachers from across the Middle East compete with Islamists and traditional Zawiyas and Ulema, as well as French satellite T.V., for the believing Muslim’s attention and affection.

Thus, as the CIDDEF (2009) surveys also note, even as a majority of Algerian women wear a veil, they do so in varying fashions, from the most designer to the most modest and accompany it with a wide array of jeans, dresses, pants, lipstick and eyeliner. And even as more men and women are reluctant to say that polygamy is religiously wrong and divorce morally permissible, the numbers of the former continue to fall and the latter to rise. Likewise, despite rising religious reticence about women in the workplace and the moral hazards of modern life, more women feel comfortable about going out in public “into the streets,” the rate of women going to work continues to grow (albeit modestly), and fewer parents admonish their children to not drink beer.

The lack of state leadership over the trajectory of religious practice in Algeria can help explain why, despite doing much to depoliticize the institution of Islam in Algeria, the Bouteflika regime has recently attempted to regain its religious authority through regulation and by more
openly dividing and ruling Islamist parties. A further restructuring of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2007-8, for example, has created, stricter codes of dress and speech for Imams in order to ensure that they conform to a traditionally Algerian, Malekite-style Islam, as opposed to what is perceived to be more Islamist-friendly Middle Eastern styles of prayer and dress. In addition, the reforms legally empower the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ inspectors with the right to make judicial cause against wayward Imams and mosques.69 This restriction has occurred at a time of increased public discipline for individuals who have denigrated Islam, including the condemnation of a woman to ten years in prison for showing disrespect to the Qur’an70 and the imprisonment of two soldiers for smoking in public during the day in Ramadan.71 In addition, in 2006 proselytism on the part of either Christians or Shiites was criminalized by creating prison sentences for anyone who “incites, constrains or uses any means of seduction to convert a Muslim to another religion” (Teissier 2008).

The assertiveness of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has also coincided with Bouteflika’s use of the mosques to support his political campaigns72 and his clampdown of Djaballah’s political activities.73 It has also created tensions between Bouteflika and the MSP, who has accused the Ministry of Religious Affairs of undemocratically muzzling Imams who are favorably inclined towards the MSP.74 The MSP and the Ministry of Religious Affairs have also publically disagreed on the Islamic legitimacy of several of Bouteflika’s parliamentary projects led by Bouteflika75 including, most recently, a proposed law requiring citizens to remove their veils and cut their beards to qualify for a national identity card.76 These tensions have been further underscored by the growing hostility in state Universities between student organizations loyal to the MSP and other student groups which has resulted in at least one student death so far.77
Thus, the Bouteflika government is in the process of, once again, changing the framework and dynamics of the relationship between religion and state in Algeria and risks a repetition of earlier patterns of government actions which led to the politicization and radicalization of Algerian religious leaders in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 2004, Islamist discourse has not moderated any further and there are signs which might be interpreted as a reversal of previous moderation. These signs include the recent rhetoric of two current MSP leaders, Abdelmadjid Menasra\textsuperscript{78} and Bouguerra Soltani,\textsuperscript{79} whose statements about the political role of Shari’a in Algeria are more reminiscent of Nahnah’s shuracracy of the early 1990s and digress from his blueprint for a pluralist Muslim democracy of the early 2000s. The student conflicts associated with the MSP and other student groups are especially worrying, particularly given the history of the Algerian University as the locus of religious versus state contestation.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to do several things. The first part re-examined the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and argued for creating a broader conceptualization of the inclusion mechanism. The second part of the paper examined the effects of such inclusion strategies in Algeria which affected the Islamist parties of HAMAS/MSP/HMS and Ennahda/MRN/Islah. It found that even as Algeria has failed to construct fully democratic institutions, these Islamist parties responded to offers of inclusion by moderating their discourse towards democracy and elections even while continuing to work towards some Islamist political goals. The electoral participation of Islamist parties along with more governmental favoritism towards Islam in Algeria also seems to be linked to recent changes in national religious participation.
I would like to conclude by affirming Isabelle Werenfels’ observation about Algerian politics and democracy, namely, that the Islamist Parties’ growing pragmatism is not enough to make democracy work in Algeria. That said, it does not invalidate the inclusion-moderation hypothesis either. Within the limited space of a semi-democratic electoral regime, Islamist political parties that once espoused an exclusive religious ideology have exercised power in “democratic” ways, growing in their recognition of the legitimacy of non-religious political parties and generally promoting the political rights of non-religious individuals. The participation of Islamists in Algerian politics has helped shift Algeria’s political and social landscape in a more religious direction and this has consequences for future democratic life which should not be discounted. Yet, it is becoming more difficult to argue that these Islamists would not subject themselves to the same constraints of governing within a more fully democratic regime in order to compete with other political forces and win and exercise power.


2 See, for example, the July, 2008 issue of *Journal of Democracy*.


4 I considered all articles and interviews with leading Islamist politicians, candidates or intellectuals, from 1992 onwards, in two Algerian “dailies,” *El Watan* and *Liberté*, as well as those collected on the website of *Algeria Watch*, a human rights organization documenting politics in Algeria, and the *Revue de la Presse*, a monthly Algerian publication which reviews leading stories from the French and Arabic Algerian press.
I conducted thirty-five “expert” interviews with Algerian members of parliament (three-fourths from Islamist parties), party heads, journalists and academics.


As argued in Ellen Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition,” Comparative Politics 36 (January 2004), 159-179; Brumberg, pp.57-8;
Eva Wegner, “Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence,” in Oliver Schlumberger (ed) 


15 Schwedler, pp. 11-26.


18 See discussion in Wegner, pp.56, 89; Lust-Okar, p. 160.


22 Wickham, p.219.


24 Fuller, p. 52.

Luizard, p. 258.


See especially, Lahuari Addi, “La Langage Politique des Islamistes Algériens” [The Political Language of Algerian Islamists],” Quotidien d’Oran, September 2nd, 2004) and Al-Ahnaf et al.

See, for example, Yahia Zoubir and Louisa Dris-Ait Hamadouche, “L’Islamisme en Algérie [Islamism in Algeria ],” Maghreb-Machrek, 188 (Summer 2006), 63-86.


Le Soir d’Algerie, March 24th, 1999.


39 Thanks to an official state of emergency which has not been dismissed since 1995 and to legislative rules which allow the executive to appoint a one third of the Senate, Mohammed Hachemaoui, “La Représentation Politique en Algérie: 1997-2002 [Political Representation in Algeria],” *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, 53(2003), 35-72.

40 In addition to their economic failures, the Algerian state tortured protestors in October of 1988, mistreated thousands of Islamist political prisoners, was slow to negotiate with the FIS and probably played a sinister role in some of the ensuing violence against Algerian civilians.

41 Larierge, p. 27.

42 Secretary of MSP in Oran, interview with author, February 26th, 2009, Oran, Algeria.

43 It also pressured the government-run TV to drop an Arabic version of *Star Academy* and protesting Algeria’s relations with Israel and Denmark.


48 Interview with author, Algiers, March 15th, 2009.


For example, abolishing the practice allowing soldiers to vote in their military barracks. See the *Loi organique relatives aux elections* n. 04-01, passed in February of 2004 and available at www.joradp.dz/TRV/FElect.pdf

Saying in an interview (*El Watan*, June 23rd, 2002) “It is true that the MRN represents the Islamic current, but it is also true that it represents, above all, the Algerian nation.”


Al-Ahnaf et al. pp. 52-53

Interview with author, March 8th, 2009, Algiers, Algeria.


Both parties retain a core constituency, including, for Djaballah, the 250,000 individuals who voted for him in a 2009 online poll conducted by the popular Arabic daily, *Echorouk*, and, for the MSP, the 10,000 Algerians who came out to march for the 5th year anniversary of Nahmah’s death.


Amghar and Boubekeur, p.7.
The increase in the Gallup number is mostly fueled by an increase in the number of female respondents who said they went to the mosque-up from 26.5% in the World Values Survey to 52% in the Gallup World Poll, while the male respondents grew only from 72% to 74% and illustrates one of the problems with the use of mosque attendance as a measure of religiosity in the Muslim world: Going to the mosque to pray on Friday is a predominantly male ritual and is religiously obligatory for neither men nor women in Islam.


Down from 18 to 7% of men with favorable perceptions and 36 to 25% of women.


Where, on sites such as www.fatwa-online.com, any Muslim can shop around for convenient moral advice.

See also El Watan, May 9th, 2010.


Echourouk, October 9th, 2007.


Bouteflika’s Minister of the Interior, for example, repeatedly blocked political gatherings by Djaballah in 2007-2008, and then simply barred him from engaging in political activity altogether.


“La Polèmique sur le Hidjab et la Barbe Enfle [Polemics on Beards and the Hidjab Swell],” *Le Quotidien d’Oran*, April 7th, 2010.


“Hamas ou l’Islamisme en Costume [Hamas or Islamism in Disguise],” *El Watan*, November 4<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

See interviews, June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2007 and January 15<sup>th</sup>, 2009 in *El Watan*.